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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
an Alford1 to felony injury a 
child, the district court sentenced him to five years, with two years fixed, and retained 
jurisdiction. Mr. Elizondo and the State had previously entered into a plea agreement 
wherein the State agreed to recommend local jail time and probation. At sentencing, 
however, the prosecutor impliedly disavowed the State's promised sentence and 
breached the plea agreement. Mr. Elizondo now appeals from his Judgment of 
Conviction, contending the State's breach of the plea agreement violated his right to 
due process. Mr. Elizondo also contends that the district court abused its discretion by 
imposing an excessive sentence. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The State filed an Information charging Mr. Elizondo with two counts of sexual 
battery of a minor, Idaho Code§ 18-150SA, and one count of felony injury to a child, 
Idaho Code§ 18-1501(1). (R., pp.36-38.) For felony injury to a child. the State alleged 
that Mr. Elizondo caused injury by ''choking her by placing his hand around her neck 
while he was on top of her." (R., p.37.) 
Pursuant to a plea agreement with the State, Mr. Elizondo entered into an Alford 
plea to an amended charge of felony injury to a child. (R., pp.39-43; Tr. Vol. 1, 2 p.14, 
L.19-p.15, L.3.) In the amended charge, the State alleged that Mr. Elizondo caused 
1 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
2 There are three transcripts on appeal. The transcript of the entry of plea hearing will 
be cited at Volume I, and the transcript of the sentencing hearing will be cited at Volume 
II. The third transcript of the preliminary hearing is not relevant to this appeal and will 
not be cited herein. 
1 
and the an Amended to 
were 
Information. I, 1 In 
State agreed to recommend local jail time and probation. (R., p.41; Tr. Vol. I, p.15, 
Ls.9-17.) The district court accepted Mr. Elizondo's guilty plea. (Tr. Vol. I, p.19, 1 
21.) 
At sentencing, the victim and the victim's mother provided statements to the 
district court. (Tr. VoL 11, p.8, L.16-p.10, L.19.) The State also submitted a written victim 
impact statement (R., pp.46-47.) The State then made the following argument and 
recommendation: 
In this particular case, there was a pretrial settlement offer with a 
recommendation for local jail time and probation As such, the State's 
recommendation in this case is for four years fixed, followed by three 
years indeterminate for a seven-year unified sentence. We're asking to 
place the defendant on four years of supervised probation, and we are 
asking the Court to impose some actual jail time. Obviously, the PSI does 
recommend a retained jurisdiction, but we're bound by our 
recommendation for time and probation. 
This case involves some very serious allegations, a very disturbing 
set of facts. However, I think something the State had taken into 
consideration was this was a first criminal conviction of any kind. 
So, with that being said, I think given the nature of the offense that 
the defendant has pied guilty to and has taken accountability for, the 
felony injury to a child, I think that there should be some significant jail 
time imposed without the potential for work release or even treatment 
release, if that was appropriate. I think somewhere between six months is 
appropriate given the severity of this offense and the fact that the PSI 
does recommend a rider. I think taking that into account, I think a longer 
period of incarceration would certainly be appropriate. 
This has obviously affected [the victim] and her family and caused 
significant damage to them, so I think that some punishment is certainly 
appropriate. 
I also think that in a case like this, we have to consider deterrence 
to the public, as well as to the defendant in this case, and so I think a 
seven-year sentence, a heftier sentence, would certainly be appropriate. 
Normally, given the lack of criminal history, we would probably 
recommend something lower, but I think given the nature of this particular 
offense, that would be a more appropriate sentence for deterrence, as well 
2 
as placing the defendant on a longer period of 
that would be beneficial in to ensure 
(Tr. Vol. 11, p.1 L.17-p.14, L.4.) 
Following the State's argument and recommendation, Mr. Elizondo's counsel 
objected pursuant to State v. Wills, 140 Idaho 773 (Ct. App. 2004), contending that the 
State breached the plea agreement. (Tr. Vol. II, p.14, Ls.7-10.) Mr. Elizondo's counsel 
explained that the State had agreed to Mr. Elizondo's release from custody, agreed to 
dismiss the two counts of sexual battery, and agreed to recommend probation-all 
indications that the State did not find the case to be severe or Mr. Elizondo to be a 
danger to the public. (Tr. Vol. 11, p. 14, Ls.11-13, p 14, L.24-p.15, L.7.) But now at 
sentencing, Mr. Elizondo's counsel argued. the State was highlighting the severity of the 
crime and the danger to the public, essentially trying to "sabotage" the plea agreement. 
(Tr. Vol. 11, p. 14, Ls.11-17.) Mr. Elizondo's counsel also noted that the facts of the case 
were "highly disputed," which the State "recognized" when it offered the plea deal. 
(Tr. Vol. 11, p.15, Ls.13-16.) 
The district court sentenced Mr. Elizondo to five years, with two years fixed, and 
retained jurisdiction. (Tr. Vol. 11, p.20, Ls.12-20.) Mr. Elizondo filed a timely notice of 
appeal from the district court's Judgment and Sentence Retaining Jurisdiction. 
(R., pp.51-52, 58-59.) 
3 
ISSUES 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of 
five years, with two years fixed, upon Mr. Elizondo, following his Alford plea to 
felony injury to a child? 
4 
ARGUMENT 
The State Deprived Mr. Elizondo Of His Right To Due Process When The State 
Breached The Plea Agreement By Impliedly Disavowing Its Promised Sentencing 
Recommendation 
"It is well established that when a plea rests in any significant degree on a 
promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the 
inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled." State v. Halbesleben, 147 
Idaho 161, 165 (Ct App. 2009) (citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 
(1971 )). 'This principle is derived from the Due Process Clause and the fundamental 
rule that, to be valid, a guilty plea must both voluntary and intelligent." Id. (citing 
Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508-09 (1984); State v. Rutherford, 107 Idaho 910, 
913 (Ct. App. 1985)). "If the prosecution has breached its promise given in a plea 
agreement, whether that breach was intentional or inadvertent, it cannot be said that the 
defendant's plea was knowing and voluntary, for the defendant has been led to plead 
guilty on a false premise." Id. Thus, a breach of a plea agreement "goes to the 
foundation or basis of a defendant's rights" because it affects whether the guilty plea 
was entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. State v. Jafek, 141 Idaho 71, 7 4 
(2005); see also State v. Allen, 143 Idaho 267, 271 & n.1 (Ct. App. 2006) (declining to 
overrule precedent holding that a breach of the plea agreement violates the defendant's 
constitutional rights). 
When there is no objection to the alleged breach of the plea agreement, the 
defendant may raise the issue on appeal under the fundamental error standard. Jafek, 
140 Idaho at 74; Ha/bes/eben, 147 Idaho at 164-65; State v. Wills, 140 Idaho 773, 774-
75 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Daubs, 140 Idaho 299, 300 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Jones, 
5 
301 2003). If an IS breach, 
a 
is a ,a is 
State proves 'beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute 
to the [sentence imposed]."' State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 22 (2010) (quoting 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). Here, Mr. Elizondo objected to the 
State's argument at sentencing, and therefore this issue is reviewed under the harmless 
error standard. (See Tr. Vol. II, p.14, Ls.7-10.) 
The State breaches the plea agreement if the prosecutor at sentencing 
circumvents or impliedly disavows the State's promised sentence. Although a 
prosecutor is not obligated to make an "enthusiastic" recommendation of the State's 
promised sentence, "a prosecutor may not circumvent a plea agreement . . through 
words or actions that convey a reservation about a promised recommendation, nor may 
a prosecutor impliedly disavow the recommendation as something which the prosecutor 
no longer supports." Jones, 139 Idaho at 302. The prosecutor's "overall conduct must 
be reasonably consistent with making such a recommendation, rather than the reverse." 
Halbes/eben, 147 Idaho at 165. 
In Jones, for example, the prosecutor stated that the case was "one of the most 
disturbing" she had seen and emphasized the present offense, the defendant's history 
of violence, and the defendant's refusal to accept responsibility. 139 Idaho at 300-01. 
The Court of Appeals determined that "the prosecutor's comments here were 
'fundamentally at odds' with the State's promised sentencing recommendation, which 
called for leniency." Id. at 303 (quoting State v. Lankford, 127 Idaho 608, 617 (1995)). 
The Court of Appeals concluded, "Although the prosecutor uttered the recommendation 
6 
by the plea agreement, statements 
Court of Appeals 
sentence and remanded for resentencing before a different judge. Id. 
disavowed 
Similarly, in Daubs, the prosecutor acknowledged the State's promised sentence, 
but then "highlighted the contrary recommendation of the PSI investigator as well as the 
basis for that recommendation," including the nature of the crime, the defendant's prior 
record, and substance abuse issues. 140 Idaho at 301. The prosecutor also presented 
and discussed statements by the victims' parents. Id. The Court of Appeals determined 
that the prosecutor "impliedly embraced the PSI recommendation" and "constructively 
disavowed its recommendation" by emphasizing "the harsher PSI prison sentence 
recommendation" and embellishing "the nature of the victims' parents' statements." Id. 
Thus, the Court of Appeals held that the State "failed to fulfill its side of the bargain." Id. 
The Court of Appeals vacated the defendant's sentence and remanded for resentencing 
before a different judge. Id. 
Finally, in Wills, the prosecutor described its promised sentence "as the minimum 
to be imposed" and indicated that "this minimum was made with 'great restraint."' 140 
Idaho at 776. The prosecutor also discussed the nature and severity of the crime, as 
well as the defendant's likelihood of reoffending Id. at 774. The Court of Appeals 
determined that "the prosecutor conveyed a reservation regarding the advisability of 
imposing those sentences and implied that longer terms would be more appropriate," 
which was "fundamentally at odds" with the plea agreement. Id. at 776. Again, the Court 
of Appeals held that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement by denying the 
7 
the of the bargain. Id. defendant's sentence was vacated h 
case a Id. 
In contrast, the State did n 
breach the plea agreement due to the prosecutor's statements at sentencing. 147 Idaho 
168. In that case, the prosecutor presented "vigorous argument of the facts of 
Halbesleben's crimes." Id. The Court of Appeals found no breach of the plea agreement 
due to the prosecutor's statements because, in part, the prosecutor presented its 
argument in anticipation of the defense's argument for less, which it was free to do 
pursuant to the agreement. Id. The Court of Appeals reasoned, "The prosecutor's 
vigorous argument did not undermine the sentencing recommendation but, rather, 
buttressed it against any argument from defense counsel that Halbesleben merited 
even lesser sentences based on mitigating factors." Id. The Court of Appeals also 
recognized that "the prosecutor made no allusion to a more severe recommendation 
contained in the PSI nor gave any personal opinion that Halbesleben's crimes merited a 
greater punishment than what was recommended." Id. Thus, the prosecutor did not 
impliedly disavow the plea agreement in Halbesleben. Id. 
Similar to Jones, Daubs, and Wills, the prosecutor's argument here was 
"fundamentally at odds" with the State's promised sentence, "which called for leniency." 
Jones, 139 Idaho at 303 ( quoting Lankford, 127 Idaho at 617). For one, the prosecutor 
explicitly identified the more severe sentence recommended in the PSI. (Tr. Vol. II, p.12, 
Ls.24-25, p.13, L.12.) The prosecutor contrasted the PSl's recommended sentence 
with the sentence it was "bound" to recommend. (Tr. Vol. 11, p.12, Ls.24-25.) The 
prosecutor also stated, "I think somewhere between six months is appropriate given the 
severity of this offense and the fact that the PSI does recommend a rider. I think taking 
8 
an 
account, I think a longer period of incarceration would be appropriate. 
made much more 11, 1 10-1 Halbesleben, 
recommendation. 1 Idaho at 168. 
Daubs, the prosecutor here "constructively disavowed its recommendation" and 
"impliedly embraced the PSI recommendation. 140 Idaho at 301. 
In addition, the prosecutor stated that this case involved "serious allegations" and 
"a very disturbing set of facts." (Tr. VoL II, 13, Ls.1-2.) Referencing the victim impact 
statements, the prosecutor explained, "This has obviously affected [the victim] and her 
family and caused significant damage to them, so I think that some punishment is 
certainly appropriate." (Tr. Vol. II, p.13, L 1 ) Thus, the prosecutor drew the district 
court's attention to the nature of the crime and the victim impact statements, even 
though the facts were highly disputed, evidenced by the State's plea bargain to dismiss 
two of the original charges. 
Moreover, the prosecutor completely undermined one of the primary reasons for 
the State's promised sentence: the absence of any criminal history. The prosecutor first 
identified the State's justification for its promised sentence, stating, ·'1 think something 
the State had taken into consideration was this was a first criminal conviction of any 
kind " (Tr. Vo!. 11, p.13, Ls.2-4.) But then, at the end of the prosecutor's argument, she 
provided: 
I also think that in a case like this, we have to consider deterrence 
to the public, as well as to the defendant in this case, and so I think a 
seven-year sentence, a heftier sentence, would certainly be appropriate. 
Normally, given the lack of criminal history, we would probably 
recommend something lower, but I think given the nature of this particular 
offense, that would be a more appropriate sentence for deterrence, as well 
as placing the defendant on a longer period of supervised probation. I 
think that would be beneficial in order to ensure that we don't have other 
law violations and that the public is protected. 
9 
VoL 11, p.1 
the 
18-p.14, L.3.) With this argument emphasizing the need 
with a 
promised 
" 
in the plea 
conveyed "a reservation regarding the advisability of imposing" the State's promised 
sentence and implied that "a longer term[] would be more appropriate." Wills, 140 Idaho 
at 776. 
In summary, the prosecutor's "overall conduct" here was not "reasonably 
consistent" with the State's promised recommendation for a lenient sentence of 
probation and local jail time. Halbesleben, 147 Idaho at 165. The prosecutor "uttered the 
recommendation required by the plea agreement," but "her other statements effectively 
disavowed the recommendation ... and advocated a harsher sentence." Jones, 139 
Idaho at 303. As in Jones, Daubs, and Wills, Mr. Elizondo respectfully requests that this 
Court conclude that the State breached the plea agreement by failing to fulfill its side of 
the bargain Mr. Elizondo respectfully requests that the Court vacate his sentence and 
remand for resentencing before a different judge. 
IL 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Five 
Years, With Two Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Elizondo, Following His Alford Plea To Felony 
Injury To A Child 
"It is well-established that '[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an 
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court 
imposing the sentence."' State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v. 
Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (alteration in original)). Here, Mr. Elizondo's 
sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum. See I.C. § 18-1501. Accordingly, to 
show that the sentence imposed was unreasonable, Mr. Elizondo "must show that the 
10 
in light of the governing is excessive under any reasonable of 
1 Idaho 
a sentence 
(2002). 
that a should be 
tailored to the purpose for which the sentence is imposed." State v. Adamcik, 152 Ida ho 
445,483 (2012) (quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)). 
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an 
independent review of the entire record available to the trial court at 
sentencing, focusing on the objectives of criminal punishment: (1) 
protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public; (3) 
possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for 
wrongdoing. 
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. "A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to 
accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the 
related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution." State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 
122, 132 (2011). 
First, Mr. Elizondo asserts that the district court abused its discretion at 
sentencing by imposing a sentence based on its incorrect understanding of the charged 
conduct. The district court stated at sentencing: 
Although he entered into an Alford plea, the allegation of this specific 
count stated that he did willfully inflict upon a child under the age of 18, to 
wit: under the age of 16 years, unjustifiable physical pain or mental 
suffering, to wit: choking her by placing his hands around her neck while 
he was on top of her, all of which is contrary to the form, force, and effect 
of the statute. 
(Tr. Vol. II, p.20, Ls.5-11 (emphasis added).) This recitation of the charged offense is 
simply incorrect. Although the original Information alleged the above conduct, the 
Amended Information did not. (R., pp.36-38, 42-43.) The Amended Information 
provided that Mr. Elizondo 
did, under circumstances likely to produce great bodily harm, willfully 
cause or permit a child to suffer unjustifiable mental suffering, to-wit: 
11 
, to-wit: of the 
which is 
d however, 
sixteen 
to 
on the 
conduct the original Information to support its sentencing decision-the district court 
stated, "I am concerned about the potential risk and the risk factors as it relates to this 
particular offense," and then read from the wrong charging instrument. (Tr. Vol. 11, p.20, 
Ls.2-11.) Based on these concerns, the district court imposed a period of retained 
jurisdiction "for the protection of society" and "further review of [Mr. Elizondo] while in 
custody." (Tr. Vol. II, p.20, Ls.15-20.) Mr. Elizondo submits that the district court abused 
its discretion at sentencing by imposing a sentence for conduct not charged in the 
Amended Information 
Second, Mr. Elizondo submits that the district court should have sentenced him 
to a lesser term of imprisonment or probation in light of the mitigating factors. As noted 
Mr. Elizondo had never been arrested, and he had no prior misdemeanor or 
felony convictions. (PSI, pp.4-5.) He also complied with all of the rules of his release 
from custody. (Tr. Vol. 11, p.17, Ls.6-7.) He did not commit any new crimes or violate the 
no contact order. (Tr. Vol. II, p.16, Ls.10-15.) In addition, Mr. Elizondo accepted 
responsibility for his conduct even though he entered into an Alford plea and the facts 
were very much in dispute. (Tr. Vol. 11, p.15, L.13-p.16, L.4, p.17, Ls.21-23.) Further, 
Mr. Elizondo has the resources to succeed on probation. He has the skills to obtain 
full-time employment and no issues with substance abuse. (PSI, pp.8-9, 9-10; Tr. Vol. 
II, p.17, Ls.2-5.) His relationship with his family is "good." (PSI, p.6.) His parents 
attended every court proceeding to show their support. (Tr. Vol. II, p.16, Ls.19-21.) In 
light of this information, the district court's sentence was unreasonable because it was 
12 
for of or accomplish the other objectives 
an under strict in the 
community as well as punishment and deterrence. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Elizondo respectfully requests that this Court vacate his sentence and 
remand his case for a new sentencing hearing before a different district judge, with 
instructions that the State recommend a sentence that strictly adheres to the plea 
agreement. Alternatively, he respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as 
it deems appropriate. 
DATED this 3rd day of December, 2015. 
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